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Introduction  
Social media allows politicians to interact with colleagues, journalists and the 
general public, who can all help representatives’ re-election quests by spreading their 
message. In particular, representatives can foster an electoral connection at essentially 
no cost by engaging with voters (Lassen and Brown, 2011; Mayhew, 1974). By contrast, 
the traditional campaign toolbox is costly in terms of resources. Personal meetings 
with constituents cost time, while leaflets and other forms of advertisement cost 
money. Social media therefore constitutes an attractive alternative to these potentially 
expensive forms of outreach and communication. Next to Facebook, Twitter is one 
such popular platform. It allows users to send messages (tweets) to their followers as 
well as to share (‘re-tweet’) the tweets of others. Tweets are limited in length to 140 
characters and thus resemble text messages. Users are identified by their ‘handle’ (e.g. 
@MartinSchulz). So-called hashtags (e.g. #EP2014) allow users to engage in debates 
and to identify trending topics. Social media thus carries the promise of the electoral 
benefits of personalisation and interaction (Kruikemeier, 2014; Kruikemeier et al., 
2013), but at the very least it allows representatives to broadcast their message 
directly to voters (Golbeck et al., 2010; Graham et al., 2013). 
Such qualities are particularly germane within the context of the EP, which is 
marked by a weak ‘electoral connection’ between MEPs and their electorate. This is 
because European elections are ‘second-order national elections’ that are typically of 
low salience to voters and fought on national, rather than European issues (Hix and 
Marsh, 2011; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Social media 
might help invigorate the electoral connection by allowing representatives to reach 
everyday citizens more directly and to interact with voters across large constituencies. 
However, this is not to suggest that social media is a panacea for political actors. User 
numbers of Twitter, in particular, remain relatively low. If politicians make use of social 
media, they risk exposure to abuse given the lower inhibition towards impolite and 
uncivil communication online compared to offline (see e.g. Papacharissi, 2004). While 
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there is a general sense that social media matters, we do not know under what 
conditions and to what extent this is the case. 
Accordingly, this article investigates the extent to which parliamentarians use 
social media platforms, such as Twitter, to foster an online ‘electoral connection’ with 
voters (Lassen and Brown, 2011; Mayhew, 1974). Carey and Shugart (1995) 
demonstrate that the ballot structure and institutional design of electoral systems 
determine parliamentarians’ incentives to invest in cultivating a ‘personal vote’. We 
develop hypotheses based upon this reasoning, in order to test whether MEPs use 
Twitter to build such an electoral connection and campaign for a personal vote via 
social media. In particular, we assess to what extent this ‘electoral connection’ is 
sustained during a three-month period beyond the immediate elections.  
The possible emergence of an online electoral connection within the EP and the 
degree to which it is shaped by national proportional representation electoral 
institutions has important implications for both the literature on comparative 
institutional design, as well as the broader literature on campaigning for re-election. 
Integrating social media campaigns within a more traditional comparative institutions 
framework, we seek to contribute to the debate on the implications of the internet on 
politics (Farrell, 2012). Furthermore, given social media’s ease of use and free-of-cost 
nature, we seek to address whether social media as a new tool upsets traditional 
campaigning dynamics (see Small, 2008). Therefore, we examine whether established, 
major parties are more active on social media than smaller ones. Moreover, we 
investigate to which extent social media campaigning may be demand-driven based 
upon the composition of party voters. Yet, we consider our main contribution as 
testing whether standard theories of electoral institutions can explain social media 
activity and whether established findings on a weak electoral connection hold for 
online, social media campaigns.  
Two important limitations should be noted. First, electoral institutions only 
vary across member states within the scope of Article 1 of Council Decision 2002/772, 
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which stipulates that MEPs ‘shall be elected on the basis of proportional 
representation’. European elections may be an ideal laboratory for testing different 
variants of proportional representation within a single legislature (Bowler and Farrell, 
2011; Farrell and Scully, 2005), but they do not allow us to study majoritarian systems. 
Second, while our focus on the electoral connection means that we investigate re-
election campaigning, incumbents and their campaigns might be substantively 
different from challengers and their campaigns. While this does present a potential 
drawback that our results are not generalisable to all campaigns, we do believe that 
our examination of all re-election seeking MEPs and their use of Twitter permits us 
sufficient analytical purchase to draw important conclusions.  
In order to examine the role of Twitter in MEP campaigns, we analyse the 
decision of outgoing MEPs from the seventh session of the EP to use Twitter, as well as 
the extent to which they rely upon it during the 2014 EP campaign. To do so, we draw 
upon original data on their Twitter usage, taken over a three-month period between 
March and July 2014. This data is collected through the automated programme 
interface (API) with the social media platform, using the Chorus Tweetcatcher software 
package (Chorus Analytics, 2014). Raw Twitter data is then matched with relevant 
information about electoral institutions and the personal background of each MEP.  
Our findings indicate a strong relationship between traditional electoral system 
variables, such as list type and district magnitude, and Twitter usage—a relationship 
that we might expect to observe in an ‘offline’ campaign. By contrast, established, 
major parties and resource-strapped minor ones equally seem to use social media for 
electoral campaigning, even though we might expect the former to conduct more 
professional, multifaceted campaigns. Our findings also provide novel insights that 
MEPs are the more active on social media the more citizens they represent. This 
means that they use Twitter constructively where it would otherwise be resource-
intensive to campaign. They are particularly active on Twitter where demand for social 
media campaigning may be high, e.g. if parties target younger voters and where social 
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network usage is high, even though this finding does not extend to internet usage of 
party supporters specifically. While this suggests that social media might help 
invigorate the weak electoral connection, the results demonstrate that Twitter activity 
is largely limited to vote-seeking during the campaign rather than constituting a 
sustained attempt to create an online ‘electoral connection’ (see also Vergeer, 
Hermans and Sams, 2013).  
 
Electoral politics and social media 
MEPs face serious challenges when campaigning. The 2014 post-election survey 
found that only 57 per cent of the electorate felt that they had all the information they 
needed in order to cast their vote (European Parliament/TNS Opinion, 2014: 16). Only 
a minority of 47 per cent thought it was very important which candidates were elected 
in their country (European Parliament/TNS Opinion, 2014: 67). Even fewer citizens 
(42.54 per cent) turned out to vote, marking the lowest ever turnout in European 
elections. This was despite the elections being advertised as ‘different’, given that the 
major party groups nominated lead candidates for the first time (see Hobolt, 2014; 
Peñalver García and Priestley, 2015; Schmitt, Hobolt, et al., 2015).  
Accordingly, European elections are considered ‘second-order national 
elections’ (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Given their low 
salience, voters cast their ballot largely based upon national considerations, leading to 
a weak electoral connection between representatives and the electorate (Hix and 
Marsh, 2007, 2011; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012). Nevertheless, Hobolt and Høyland 
(2011) demonstrate that rather than simply punishing parties in national government, 
voters reward experience of candidates. If such personal characteristics matter, there 
may be incentives for MEPs seeking re-election to invest in creating a long-term 
electoral connection. MEPs might be well advised to signal their accomplishments and 
look to voters in keeping with Mayhew’s three strands of an electoral connection: 
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advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Therefore, we analyse whether MEPs 
use social media and how prolific they are in doing so.  
In this respect, we assume that Twitter activity is indeed aimed at the three 
objectives outlined by Mayhew and that it is beneficial to fostering an electoral 
connection, despite the risks of online abuse and incivility (Gervais, 2015; Papacharissi, 
2004). Indeed, there is strong evidence that most politicians use Twitter for one-way 
‘broadcasting’ rather than interactive dialogue (Golbeck et al., 2010; Graham et al., 
2013). No matter whether a MEP tweets a link to his speech, re-tweets an article in a 
newspaper, or potentially replies to a follower, these actions merit consideration as 
campaigning, because they will arguably reflect their preferences, views, or 
constituency service (Jackson and Lilleker, 2011; Lilleker and Koc-Michalska, 2013). In 
essence, this means that we consider each tweet simply as a message broadcast by the 
representative, and equivalent to an election leaflet (Hix and Hagemann, 2009) or 
direct e-mail (Bowler and Farrell, 2011). We consider this a valuable step in studying 
the impact of electoral institutions on the electoral connection.  
 
The impact of social media on the electoral connection 
Social media lends itself to building and maintaining an electoral connection, 
since it allows for politicians to conveniently contact voters. However, in a small study 
of Dutch candidates in the European election, Vergeer et al. (2013: 477) find that ‘most 
candidates in 2009 still used Twitter reluctantly’. Twitter was still a new phenomenon 
then, and these early adopters used Twitter for electoral rather than continuous 
campaigning. With social media and Twitter in particular being popular beyond early 
adopters today, social media platforms might provide important benefits when 
campaigning for personal votes. In particular, it comes at a low cost when compared to 
the traditional electioneering toolbox of election leaflets, advertisements, and events. 
This low cost might enable representatives to sustain an electoral connection remotely 
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without facing a trade-off between effective legislating and constituency work (Farrell 
and Scully, 2010; Scully and Farrell, 2003).  
Therefore, the larger the number of citizens represented, the more attractive it 
might become for representatives to use Twitter. In the EP, the number of seats per 
national delegation is allocated on the basis of regressive proportionality, whereby 
larger member states have more seats than smaller ones, but are relatively under-
represented. Whereas in large member states such Germany, France, or the United 
Kingdom there are more than 800,000 inhabitants per MEP, the ratio falls to less than 
100,000 inhabitants per MEP in small states such as Malta and Luxembourg (Corbett et 
al., 2011: 29–30). MEPs from larger national delegations are thus tasked with 
representing more citizens, making the formation of an electoral connection all the 
harder.  
Therefore, if MEPs make constructive use of social media, then we might 
expect MEPs representing more citizens to have a stronger incentive to use social 
media.  
 
H1: The more citizens represented per MEP, the more active the MEP will be on 
Twitter. 
 
The impact of electoral institutions on the electoral connection  
In spite of their second-order nature, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
electoral institutions shape the behaviour of legislators in the parliamentary and 
electoral arena. Even though the EU has passed legislation stipulating a ‘uniform 
procedure’ based upon proportional representation, important national differences 
remain (Farrell and Scully, 2005, 2010). Accordingly, the electoral threshold varies 
between zero and five per cent, the ballot structure may allow for preferential forms 
of voting, and the district magnitude (the number of representatives elected in an 
electoral district) depends upon a combination of total delegation size and national 
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rules. This has important implications for the incentives of MEPs and electoral 
competition (Bowler and Farrell, 2011).  
For our purposes, the two most important differences in European elections 
relate to district magnitude and whether the ballot structure allows voters to express a 
preference for candidates. In preferential systems (such as open lists, ordered lists, or 
single transferable vote systems), voters can choose between different individual 
representatives of the party. As a consequence, candidates and parties compete 
against each other. In non-preferential (closed list) systems, voters cast their ballot for 
a party only, so electoral competition is between parties. Therefore, preferential 
systems are more candidate- than party-centred  and politicians have an incentive to 
campaign for a personal vote that differentiates themselves from their colleagues 
(Bowler and Farrell, 1993). We expect that this quest will lead MEPs to seek out venues 
such as Twitter to promote themselves as individuals. 
Carey and Shugart (1995) provide nuance to our expectations related to ballot 
structure by taking district magnitude into account. Their seminal work demonstrates 
that in candidate-centred (i.e. preferential) systems, an increase in district magnitude 
is an additional incentive to build a personal reputation. The more representatives are 
elected in a district, the more candidates there are, and the more important individual 
reputation. In contrast, an increase in district magnitude denotes a decrease in 
incentives to cultivate a personal reputation under party-centred (i.e. non-preferential) 
systems. The more representatives are elected, the less important the individual 
candidate and the more important the party label. Therefore, we expect that ballot 
structure and district magnitude will influence MEPs’ social media usage to cultivate a 
personal vote. 
Previous research provides evidence that electoral system features influence 
MEPs’ understanding of their role, that this influences their work, and that the results 
make a marked difference for voters. In line with this, Farrell and Scully  report that 
‘more open systems are associated with a greater constituency focus by elected 
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representatives’ (2010: 51), based upon MEPs’ responses to a survey asking whether 
they hold clinics for voters (see also Bowler and Farrell, 1993, 2011). The impact of 
electoral institutions on the representatives’ efforts to cultivate a personal vote is 
confirmed by Hix and Hagemann (2009) in a study on campaigning during the 2004 
European elections. They focus on traditional ‘offline politics’, using the 
Eurobarometer post-election survey, which asked respondents whether they had 
received any election leaflets. The results demonstrate that the more preferential the 
electoral system, the more citizens had received leaflets. With regard to district 
magnitude, they find the expected negative relation of district size and proportion of 
voters who had received information. This suggests despite their second order nature, 
standard insights on electoral politics do apply to ‘offline campaigning’ in European 
elections.  
In contrast, Bowler and Farrell’s (2011) findings on the same elections are more 
mixed. They demonstrate that electoral institutions perform poorly in predicting 
campaign effort, but well in predicting party- or candidate-focused campaign activities. 
Vergeer et al. (2013) more narrowly study online campaigning of candidates running in 
the 2009 European election from a communications angle. They fail to find any 
significant impact of electoral system variables on website features such as 
newsletters, personal information, and social network links. A sophisticated study on 
the campaigns of 1336 candidates in these elections by Giebler and Wüst (2011) shows 
that preferential voting did not influence campaign intensity as measured by time and 
money spent, but that it had a significant positive impact on the extent to which 
candidates used post-modern campaign tools, such as websites or social networks. 
Most recently, Lorenzo Rodríguez and Madariaga (2016) demonstrate that the ballot 
structure affected online campaign intensity in the 2014 European elections. 
This raises the question of whether electoral institutions affect MEPs’ 
campaigning on Twitter. In line with Carey and Shugart (1995), we test whether the 
connection between preferential voting and district magnitude may serve to mitigate 
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or to exacerbate a given MEP’s need to cultivate a personal vote via Twitter. From this 
follows our second set of hypotheses: 
 
H2a: In non-preferential voting systems, the larger the district magnitude, the less 
active the MEP will be on Twitter. 
 
H2b: In preferential voting systems, the larger the district magnitude, the more active 
the MEP will be on Twitter. 
 
The electoral formula also has implications for the competitiveness and 
predictability of re-election. In non-preferential systems, those at the top of a party list 
can often be certain that they will be re-elected, whereas the fate of lower-ranked 
politicians is less secure. Preferential systems that allow for voters to support 
individual candidates within a list or to re-order the list entirely contribute an 
additional aspect of uncertainty. Therefore, we also include the safety of a candidate’s 
electoral position into our analysis.  
Giebler and Wüst (2011) differentiate conceptually between hopeless, unsafe, 
and safe seats in their study of candidates in the 2009 European election. They suggest 
that candidates in the latter two categories exhibit similar behaviour in terms of 
campaign intensity and tools used (Giebler & Wüst, 2011:58), but that hopeless 
candidates significantly lag behind in terms of the intensity and tools used in their 
campaigning, including in the use of electronic and online campaign tools. While this 
may not be surprising in the case of hopeless candidates, Lassen & Brown (2011) more 
generally find that sitting Members of Congress from the most contested seats (i.e. 
those in the weakest position) were less likely to build connections with voters via the 
use of Twitter than those relatively more certain of their re-election.  
If we are able to replicate this surprising result in European elections, where 
electoral lists are drafted by parties in order to insulate party leaders with ‘safe’ 
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positions at the top (where ballot structure allows), then we should expect the most 
prominent party members and effective figureheads of national parties’ campaigns to 
be the most active on Twitter. While the mechanism of seat contestation is certainly 
distinct from that of the U.S. Congress, the position of list leaders may also suggest 
that the ‘safest’ politicians have the responsibility to take to social media more 
frequently, in the capacity of their leadership role. Accordingly, our third hypothesis 
focuses on the impact of list safety: 
 
H3: The safer the list position, the more active the MEP will be on Twitter. 
 
Does social media upset traditional power relations? 
There are also competing expectations as to how resources, usually 
operationalised by party size, influence professionalisation of campaigns and the 
uptake of social media as a campaign tool (Gibson and Römmele, 2009; Lilleker et al., 
2011). A debate in media and communication studies pits a so-called equalisation 
thesis against a normalisation thesis (Small, 2008). The equalisation thesis posits that 
innovations such as websites and social media present a cheap avenue for small 
parties to make up ground on larger, better funded ones. Adopting social media would 
allow representatives from smaller parties to bypass the gatekeeper function of 
traditional media (Lassen and Brown, 2011), in which MEPs from smaller groups are 
mentioned less frequently than those from large groups (Gattermann and 
Vasilopoulou, 2015). For instance, Lilleker and Koc-Michalska (2013) find that MEPs 
from minor national parties achieve higher performance scores in different categories 
of online campaigning than those form major parties. Equalisation then refers to social 
media levelling the playing field between resource-rich and resource-strapped parties. 
If we find support for these claims, it would suggest that social media upsets 
traditional campaigning dynamics and, if effective, might upset electoral results.  
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In contrast, the normalisation thesis stipulates that social media would form a 
natural part of election campaigns, regardless of party stature. As a consequence, the 
use of social media as a campaign tool would reflect the general professionalism and 
resources available to the candidate. Established, major parties can afford more 
professional campaigns, including social media as one of multiple channels (Lilleker et 
al., 2011). One direct way to observe party resources in a broadly comparative context 
would be to focus on their dominance in national elections. Thus we assume that 
major parties, as measured by their seat share in national parliaments, should be 
expected to have more funds, staff and training at their disposal, thereby allowing 
them to campaign more professionally. Another way is to identify government parties, 
whose candidates seem to commit more funds to campaigning (Giebler and Wüst, 
2011). In line with the normalisation thesis, we hence investigate the extent with 
which national power ought to correlate with party resources and thus favour the 
usage of Twitter as a campaign tool. 
 
H4: The more dominant the national party in the national system, the more active the 
MEP will be on Twitter.  
 
Voter demand for an ‘online’ electoral connection: the national party’s target group 
The incentives to use Twitter may not only depend upon national-level internet 
permeation of countries, that many studies control for, but also on the national party’s 
target group. To account for this variation, we introduce a variety of measures meant 
to proxy the demand for social media usage by supporters of the MEP’s national party. 
These measures, discussed in the following section, each capture various aspects that 
may leave a politician more inclined to turn to Twitter in his or her campaign and 
include aspects, such as the party voters’ mean age and their usage of the internet and 
social media to seek political information. In keeping with this line of thought, we 
expect the following: 
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H5: The greater the affinity for internet and social media among party supporters, the 
more active the MEP will be on Twitter. 
 
Data and method 
 In order to test determinants of social media usage and the conditional impact 
of electoral institutions, we collected data on the Twitter usage of all MEPs during the 
lead-up to the May 2014 elections. Using an automated tool for data capture (Chorus 
Analytics, 2014), information from the official Twitter handles of all MEPs using the 
application was collected,1 beginning two months prior to the elections and concluding 
after the seating of the 8th EP in July 2014. Captured information relevant to this 
article includes the volume of MEPs’ tweets, as well as the number of their Twitter 
followers throughout the period.  
 We then pair the newly collected social media data with an original dataset on 
the career behaviour of MEPs during the seventh EP (Daniel, 2015). The resulting 
dataset is fully comprehensive for all outgoing MEPs from the 2009-2014 EP.  
 
Dependent variables 
 Of the 856 MEPs present in the legislature at some point during the seventh EP 
session, 341 had active Twitter accounts during the election period and 245 sought re-
election.  Tweets measures a given MEP’s total number of tweets emitted at various 
points of the re-election campaign. 2 We focus on specific time points to observe the 
volume of Twitter activity throughout the campaign. The periods observed allow for us 
to capitalize on variation in Twitter usage over time.  
The Baseline Tweets version, using data from 25 March 2014, measures the 
total number of tweets that an MEP had ever made from their official Twitter handle, 
as of two months prior to the election. Although there is no ‘official’ start to the EP 
campaign, we do expect this variable to reveal valuable information about which MEPs 
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are ‘typically’ the most active on Twitter. The T-2 Months version then captures the 
number of Tweets per MEP between 25 March and 24 April, which was the last month 
of relatively ‘normal business’ in the EP, as the last plenary of the session concluded on 
17 April. The T-1 Month version between 24 April and 26 May traces activity during the 
final month of the campaign, when MEP activity on Twitter would be expected to be 
the most directly linked to campaign appeals. These two variables are evenly spaced 
and allow for direct comparison of the MEPs’ level of activity during the months of 
April and May, respectively. Then, using the T-1 Week version, we examine only the 
final week of the campaign—when Twitter usage should be almost entirely related to 
the elections, as members are fully engrossed with the campaign in their 
constituencies. Finally, the T+1 Month version examines the denouement period 
between 26 May and the seating of the new 8th EP on 6 July 2014, when the campaign 
has definitively come to a close. While we do not derive formal hypotheses for the 
effect of the electoral cycle on Twitter usage, our data nonetheless allow us to 
consider the dynamic usage of Twitter at various points in the campaign, adding useful 
context to our specific findings.  
 
Independent variables 
 A number of independent variables are coded for each MEP observation, 
pertaining both to their structural and to individual situations in the election. Citizens 
Represented measures the total number of citizens (in tens of thousands) represented 
per MEP, averaged by nationality.3 As discussed in H1, MEPs that represent more 
citizens are expected to use Twitter more actively; this grants them a relatively costless 
and efficient platform for contacting large swaths of voters.  
 H2a states that for MEPs from countries without preference voting in EP 
elections, higher district magnitude will have a negative effect on MEP tweeting. H2b is 
the corollary hypothesis that states that MEPs from countries with preferential voting, 
larger district magnitude will have a positive effect on MEP tweeting. To capture this 
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possibility, we construct a dichotomous Preferential Vote indicator that captures those 
EU member states that elect MEPs using any form of preferential voting. This includes 
lists that can be re-ordered or selected from, given a party’s suggested order, as well 
as preference lists where the party order is not suggested—such as in purely 
alphabetical lists. Average District Magnitude is then calculated on a national basis for 
the EP elections and is interacted with this measure.4  
 H3 posits that list safety positively affects social media usage. To operationalise 
this, we use polling data to identify an MEP’s List Safety on the electoral list.5 One 
particularly sophisticated method for identifying the safety of MEPs at election time 
was created by Giebler and Wüst (2011: 58), who identify ‘hopeless’ candidates during 
the 2009 election period. We begin by replicating their coding scheme to identify 
candidates from ordered lists (preferential or otherwise) who are not expected to win 
the election, given 2014 PollWatch projections (Cunningham and Hix, 2014), and assign 
them a value of 0.6 We then consider three additional categories of MEPs that Giebler 
and Wüst (2011) refer to as ‘promising’ candidates. 
Candidates from ordered lists that are featured as list leaders are assigned the 
maximum value of 3 and considered to be the most likely to be re-elected, unless they 
come from national parties that were not projected by PollWatch to win any seats at 
all (i.e. splinter candidates that have been excluded from their original party or run 
under a new list). Our list leader category also includes lists that are constructed at the 
regional level, such as in France, as well as lists where the party has suggested an order, 
but where voters can prefer specific candidates, such as in Poland.  
The next value, 2, is given to MEPs that are featured on party-ordered lists in 
positions that are likely to be elected, given PollWatch forecasts. While such 
candidates are not as secure as list leaders, we consider them ‘safe.’ The value 1 is 
then given to MEPs from purely preferential lists, given without an order, where voters 
cannot simply default to the party’s suggestions7. In such situations, all spots are 
theoretically equally ‘competitive,’ although less so than either categories 2 and 3. 
16 
 
Given the expectations of H3, we expect that the safest MEPs will be among the most 
active users of Twitter during the election period, given that they are also list leaders.  
H4 posits that MEPs from dominant national parties that might be endowed 
with greater resources will be more active on Twitter. We use two measures based 
upon ParlGov data (Döring and Manow, 2015) to capture this dimension of party 
strength, National Party Seat Share and National Party in Government. The former is 
the per cent of seats held in the lower house of the national legislature by the national 
party. The latter is a dichotomous indicator of national political parties serving in 
national government at the time of the May 2014 elections.  
Finally, H5 posits that MEPs from national parties that are more likely to have a 
demand for social media usage will be more likely to use Twitter as a mainstay in their 
campaigning strategies. To account for this possibility, we draw on data from the 2014 
European Election Study (Popa et al., 2015; Schmitt et al., 2015; Schmitt et al., 2015) to 
measure the per cent of national party voters who responded that they sought 
information on 2014 EP elections either ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ using the internet or 
social media. We use this National Party Voter Internet Affinity variable alongside the 
mean National Party Voter Age to proxy for parties that face greater incentives to 
incorporate Twitter into their campaigns.  
A host of control variables are also included in the analysis. Naturally, the 
decision of MEPs to use Twitter during the campaign may also be predicated upon 
broad national differences in the usage of online social networks. To account for these 
differences, we use data from the autumn 2013 Eurobarometer survey (European 
Commission, 2014) to construct Social Network Usage, which is the percentage of 
people in a given country that use online social networks at least once a week. To 
account for the possibility that MEPs from more extreme national parties may use 
Twitter differently than their mainstream counterparts, we use expert survey data 
from the 2014 UNC Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015) to construct three 
measures of MEPs’ national party extremeness: EU Integration, Left-Right, and GAL-
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TAN. Each variable measures the national party’s squared distance from the midpoint 
of the scales, with higher values signifying more extreme party positions on the 
relevant aforementioned category.  
Finally, the difference of an MEP’s number of Twitter Followers between time 
periods is captured for each of the periods discussed above and is lagged by one 
observation period (i.e. April’s followers may impact May’s tweets), in order to account 
for the possibility that MEPs with more social media followers may choose to interact 
with their voting base more in the application. MEP Age and Seniority (measured as 
the number of terms served in the EP) may also impact their decision use new forms of 
technology in the campaign. MEPs that have a higher profile within the legislature, 
serving as an EP Leader (any internally elected position, such as EP President, Vice 
President, Quaestor, and party group leadership positions) or a Committee Leader 
(Chair or Vice Chair) may also behave differently during the campaign. Female is used 
as a dichotomous control for MEP gender. Lastly, EP party group dummies are also 
used, to account for potential variation in usage by group. 8 
 
Modelling Choices 
Since the distribution of the dependent variable measuring the number of 
tweets emitted by MEPs during the campaign period is skewed to the right and marked 
by a variance that is larger than its mean, a negative binomial estimation of the models 
in Table 1 would technically be appropriate. However, given the high frequency of 
tweets, the substantive and statistical significance remains consistent when using a 
linear model, which allows for direct interpretation by the reader. We therefore use 
linear multi-level mixed effects models with random country intercepts.  
 
Results and analysis   
 Table 1 displays linear regression coefficients for a series of multi-level mixed 
effects models. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below each beta 
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coefficient. Although the mixed model considers the possibility for random country-
level effects to impact MEP twitter usage, the fixed effect coefficient values in the 
table can be directly interpreted, which is a major strength of the linear model. Each of 
the five models uses a version of the Tweets variable, as described in the discussion of 
the dependent variables. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
As relates to our hypotheses, we find that the number of an MEP’s Citizens 
Represented is shown to be a significant predictor of tweeting—although only up until 
the election (Models 1-4)—with each additional 10,000 constituents represented 
corresponding with a 6.79 tweet bump during the month preceding the elections. This 
confirms H1.  With respect to H3, we find that list leader MEPs actually tweeted about 
50.28 (3 x 16.76) fewer tweets than the ‘hopeless’ MEPs during the early campaign 
model (Model 2), once multivariate regression controls are introduced. This 
relationship contradicts H3 and is also confirmed in Model 3, where list leaders 
tweeted an average of 86.73 fewer tweets than ‘hopeless’ MEPs in the final month of 
the campaign. Interestingly enough, the significant effect of the list safety is not 
present during the final week of the campaign. This may be due to the fact that all 
politicians involved in the campaign are fighting for attention at insignificantly differing 
levels.  
One area that is less obvious to directly analyse relates to H2a and H2b. As each 
of these hypotheses is conditional upon the existence of a preferential voting system 
in the MEP’s home country, the Preferential Vote dummy variable is interacted with 
the Average District Magnitude measure. While the independent effect of preferential 
voting is not confirmed, except for in Model 4, we do find that the interaction of 
preferential voting systems with district magnitude is significant at various points 
during the campaign (Models 2-4). In the absence of a preferential vote (i.e. the 
variable is set to zero), we see a negative effect on increased district magnitude levels 
during the campaign (see only the Average District Magnitude variable in Models 2-4), 
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which would seem to offer support to H2a. Graphical interpretation can also be used 
to more directly interpret the conditional nature of preference voting and its 
mitigating effect on district magnitude.  
[Figure 1 about here.] 
Figure 1 uses known values of district magnitude to predict the volume of 
tweets during the final week of the campaign (Model 4), in both the presence and 
absence of a preferential voting system. Here, the relationship posited by H2a and H2b 
is much more apparent. In systems with a preferential vote, there is a sharp increase in 
the number of tweets: as the district magnitude increases, MEPs from the largest 
districts in a preferential voting system (for example, The Netherlands) were shown to 
tweet more than twice as often as MEPs from the smallest districts (for example, 
Northern Ireland, Malta, and Luxembourg). Conversely, we do observe a steady decline 
in Twitter usage, as district magnitude increases in these strictly closed list systems. It 
seems that, to the extent that Twitter is used by MEPs to make personal and direct 
appeals to voters, this is more likely to occur in more open and preference-based 
systems.  
With respect to H4, we find no support for the hypothesis that MEPs from 
larger parties at the national level tweet more often in EP elections. However, we do 
find that MEPs whose national party is in government actually tweet less during the 
periods preceding and following the European election campaign (Models 1 and 5). 
This interesting result suggests that perhaps Twitter plays a special role in ‘opposition’ 
politics during the normal legislative calendar.  
H5 examines the ‘demand’ for Twitter usage in the campaign. Here again, we 
find mixed results. Whereas parties with generally older voters do use Twitter less 
often outside of election time (Models 1 and 5), the effect disappears during the 
election period. The extent to which party voters use the internet to seek out 
campaign information (National Party Voter Internet Affinity) has no independent 
effect on the demand for additional tweets from MEPs. However, our control variables 
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suggest that an increase in the degree to which an MEP’s country of origin is 
permeated by Social Network Usage positively affects Twitter activity. Likewise, the 
individual MEP’s number of Followers influences social media usage at some points. 
 The additional control variables in the model offer further insights into the 
Twitter usage of MEPs during the campaign period. In particular, more extremist MEPs 
on the traditional left-right economic scale are shown to use Twitter less often during 
the campaign, whereas MEPs that are extreme on the GAL-TAN dimension – which 
refers to the progressive-traditional dimension of politics – were more likely to use 
Twitter. At the individual level, both seniority and MEP age have negative effects on 
Twitter usage. 
 Finally, it is also worth reiterating from the results in Table 1 that the passage 
of time clearly has an impact on the behaviour of MEPs during the campaign season. 
We might conclude from the baseline model that Twitter activity in the EP is relatively 
idiosyncratic to the individual member—a reasonable conclusion, given people’s very 
different personal attitudes towards social media usage and a conclusion that is also 
supported by the findings discussed in the motivating logistical regression analysis. 
However, Models 2-4 clearly indicate that Twitter becomes an active component of 
many MEP re-election campaigns. So active, in fact, that a dummy variable for MEPs 
seeking re-election is dropped during the estimation—simply put, the only reason to 
be active on Twitter as an MEP, during the election, is because of the election itself! 
Lastly, we include Model 5 to demonstrate that almost all systematic effects on MEP 
Twitter usage disappear entirely, once the campaign concludes. There is clear evidence 
from the collective models to suggest that Twitter has not only taken hold of the EP, 
but that it has done so for a very specific reason: campaigning.  
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Conclusions 
 This article has demonstrated that re-election campaigning using new social 
media can still be interpreted by standard theories of comparative political institutions. 
Using a novel dataset of MEP activity on Twitter, collected before, during and after the 
2014 elections, we show that there are systematic effects present that both predict an 
MEP’s decision to use Twitter in the first place, as well as the degree to which they use 
Twitter during the election period. Thereby, we are able to trace the evolution of 
traditional modes of campaigning into the present.  
 Our findings demonstrate that MEPs representing more citizens are more likely 
to use Twitter and to use it more frequently during the campaign. This means that 
MEPs make constructive use of Twitter when it might otherwise be particularly 
resource-intensive in terms of time and money to reach voters. These findings a priori 
suggest that social media might help to invigorate the weak electoral connection in the 
EU. Future research should investigate how representatives make use of the 
interactive features of social media to foster an electoral connection.  
 EU member states use different variants of proportional representation for 
European elections (Farrell and Scully, 2005). One major point of differentiation is the 
presence of preferential voting systems. In keeping with the classic expectations of the 
comparative politics literature, we find that MEPs from preferential voting systems are 
far more likely to be active on Twitter when they hail from districts of a larger 
magnitude. The reverse is found to be true of systems in which there is no voting 
preference allowed: as district magnitude increases, Twitter usage decreases. These 
findings are consistent with H2a and H2b. Future research should analyse the content 
of tweets, which would be particularly desirable in order to further test the extent to 
which candidates use Twitter to seek a personal rather than a party vote. Moreover, 
the uniform electoral procedure of the EU prevents us from investigating the effect of 
majoritarian electoral systems, in which incentives for seeking a personal vote also 
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vary (Carey and Shugart, 1995). It would be intriguing to study how these fit in with our 
findings.  
 In addition, we observe MEPs who are in jeopardy of losing their seats are most 
active on Twitter. We show that the ‘safely seated’ party leadership is less active on 
social media, compared with those in list positions classified as ‘competitive’ or even 
‘hopeless,’ based upon ballot structure and polling data. While this finding runs 
opposite to the originally expected direction, it demonstrates the potential usefulness 
of Twitter as an innovative campaigning tool. Particularly for candidates that have lost 
the support of their party or their voters and have been poorly placed on electoral lists, 
Twitter may serve as a remedy for under-funded and under-supported traditional 
campaign activities. 
While we might expect major, established parties with a strong base in national 
parliaments to lead more multi-faceted, professional campaigns including social media, 
we do not find support for this. Our only related finding is a higher level of social media 
activity for national opposition parties outside the heat of the campaign. Unlike 
incumbents that we study, challengers from the same national parties might be 
younger and generally more willing to embrace new campaign tools such as social 
media, so one avenue for future research would be test whether these findings hold 
for all candidates. 
Finally, we investigated the extent to which social media use by representatives 
may be demand driven, given the internet affinity of voters for the national party. We 
find that MEPs with younger national party voters are more active on Twitter outside 
of the campaign season, and that Twitter activity depends on general country-level 
online social network usage rather than an MEPs’ national party voters’ internet usage.  
In sum, the findings suggest that MEPs value social media to engage with voters. 
The decision to use Twitter is an innovative and essentially costless way to remotely 
spread ones message to voters. However, it is important to note that many of the 
effects described are structured by the election cycle. This reminds us not to overstate 
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the importance of social media, in particular in absence of evidence to its effectiveness 
in the quest for re-election. Twitter activity seems to be targeted at vote-seeking 
during the campaign, rather than constituting a sustained attempt to create an online 
‘electoral connection’ (Vergeer et al., 2013). It would be interesting in future research 
to gain a better understanding of MEPs’ attempts to use social media to create a long-
term electoral connection in absence of an imminent election. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1. MEPs’ Twitter handles were identified through the public Twitter list maintained by the European 
Parliament (https://twitter.com/europarl_en/lists/all-meps-on-twitter/members). 
2. Although we do not theorize about this decision directly, in the web appendix we model determinants 
of the dichotomous decision to use Twitter in order to provide contextual information and insights into 
the robustness of the variables explaining the number of Tweets. 
3. Throughout the analysis, we treat Northern Ireland as a separate country, thus there are 29 country-
level groups in all models. This is because the electoral system used by Northern Ireland is completely 
distinct from the rest of Great Britain. 
4. In Germany, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) use separate, regional lists. Therefore, we run each 
model using three different variables for German district magnitude: one using the total number of 
German MEPs, one treating the Christian Democratic MEPs separately, and one constructing a weighted 
average for the entire country. Although each variable performs similarly, we choose the latter, as it 
keeps the variable at a national (but corrected) level, as is the case with all other countries in the 
dataset. The alternate variables are available in the replication data.  
5. MEPs’ 2014 list positions are taken from Burson-Marsteller’s Europe Decides collection of all EP 
electoral lists (http://europedecides.eu/european-parliament/#tab-candidate-lists). 
6. We use PollWatch forecasts from 19 March, 22 April, and 13 May to account for temporal change in 
list safety over time. The resulting List Safety variable uses polling data from the month closest to that 
being examined in the model.  
7. The countries included in this category are Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Malta, and Northern 
Ireland.  
8. The web appendix displays descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. 
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Table 1. Frequency of MEP Tweets during and after 2014 Elections (March - July 2014). 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: # of Tweets Baseline t-2 Months t-1 Month t-1 Week t+1 Month 
IVs of Interest:            
H1. Citizens Represented 62.497** 3.758*** 6.788*** 2.663*** 0.907 
 
(24.11) (0.96) (1.51) (0.41) (1.17) 
H2. Preferential Vote -1512.570 7.062 7.178 -49.842* -52.650 
 
(1577.43) (52.26) (82.93) (22.21) (101.13) 
H2. Avg. District Magnitude 4.418 -1.855*** -3.353** -1.352*** -0.863 
 
(16.01) (0.55) (1.02) (0.39) (0.88) 
H2. Pref. Vote X Avg. Dist. Mag. 123.186* 0.672 2.828 3.239* 1.033 
 
(65.38) (2.13) (3.55) (1.33) (2.33) 
H3. MEP List Safety -194.369 -16.755* -28.908* -3.620 -6.953* 
 
(141.36) (10.09) (14.37) (7.11) (4.17) 
H4. National Party Seat Share 14.726 -0.968 -0.728 -0.229 0.746 
 
(14.78) (1.36) (2.22) (0.56) (0.69) 
H4. National Party in Gov't -1156.810* 9.468 14.422 -14.286 -39.538** 
 
(596.04) (38.76) (55.34) (16.42) (13.35) 
H5. Nat. Party Voter Internet 
Affinity -4432.368 58.993 55.297 -146.363 -14.885 
 
(5577.75) (267.08) (444.31) (138.90) (175.03) 
H5. National Party Voter Age -124.078** -1.683 -4.619 -2.119 -4.007* 
 
(41.90) (2.99) (4.93) (1.39) (1.94) 
Additional Controls:           
Member State Social Network 
Usage 111.879** 4.703** 7.842** 3.638*** 0.546 
 
(41.15) (1.50) (2.53) (0.85) (1.42) 
National Party Extreme (Left-Right) -180.782 -12.319** -14.602* -7.103* -4.551 
 
(110.98) (4.43) (7.98) (3.24) (2.96) 
National Party Extreme (GAL-TAN) 184.287* 7.596** 10.291* 5.322** 3.007* 
 
(85.32) (2.85) (4.44) (1.91) (1.22) 
National Party Extreme 
(Integration) 204.895 13.196 15.740 0.619 -0.999 
 
(188.67) (8.69) (15.11) (3.63) (4.63) 
MEP Twitter Followers (lagged) 0.031** 0.000 0.028*** 0.013* 0.003 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
MEP Seniority -97.277 -21.032* -31.967* -10.617 -1.352 
 
(147.76) (10.15) (18.31) (6.60) (4.10) 
MEP Age -100.537*** -4.224* -7.236* -2.819*** -1.901* 
 
(21.96) (2.22) (3.46) (0.82) (0.89) 
Female 61.553 55.534 84.296 12.004 11.386 
 
(494.45) (37.33) (59.93) (18.88) (14.66) 
EP Leader 217.321 -0.319 7.475 -8.798 -9.497 
 
(711.74) (31.39) (55.77) (17.38) (24.38) 
Committee Leader -215.588 -19.337 -28.844 -22.870 -26.864 
 
(520.96) (35.90) (65.84) (22.93) (25.76) 
Party Group Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6555.249 -107.124 -104.455 181.380 344.153 
 
(6112.14) (363.90) (640.97) (192.13) (234.78) 
Intercept Variance 870.123 0 0 0 47.036 
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Residual Variance 3425.731 245.823 400.637 135.139 113.749 
Intraclass Correlation 0.061 0 0 0 0.146 
N (Country Groups) 245 (28) 245 (28) 245 (28) 245 (28) 245 (28) 
Note: Significant regression coefficients starred *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.1; R.S.E. in parentheses; 
Robust clusters by country delegation; t denotes time of EP election; Authors' own calculations. 
Full table including Party Group Fixed Effects in the online appendix. 
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Figure 1. The Conditional Effect of District Magnitude on Tweeting. Week Prior to May 2014 Elections. 
